

VZCZCXRO3957
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHBUL #0094/01 0100604
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 100604Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5357
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3504

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 000094

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR KIMMITT
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD, JICCENT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2017
TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [PTER](#) [ASEC](#) [MARR](#) [AF](#) [PK](#)
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN PM AZZIZ VISIT TO AFGHANISTAN

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i., David Newell for reasons 1.4 (B)
and (D).

SUMMARY

1. (C) Afghan Deputy National Security Advisor Engineer Ibrahim characterized the January 4 visit of Pakistan Prime Minister Azziz as a "good trip." There had not been agreement on substance, but Azziz and Karzai held frank and open discussions on a range of bilateral issues. Foreign Minister Spanta's Special Advisor acknowledged the importance of dialogue with the civilian side of the Pakistan government, but focused on the need to engage more deeply with the Pakistani military and ISI, the real centers of power in Pakistan. On the Pakistani proposal to fence and mine the border, the GOA expressed its clear opposition, not just because of the consequences of mining for the civilian population but because it is not an effective tool for combatting terrorism. The real issue was command and control. Azziz reportedly had not pressed the issue in the meeting, which the GOA took to indicate the Pakistani civilian side might reconsider the proposal. Afghanistan expects a formal response on the border issue within two weeks. The GOA sees as positive Pakistani steps to create a Commission to prepare for the jirgas and is prepared to engage through that agreed channel. On Musa Qala, the main challenge for the GOA will be preventing the area from becoming a Taliban sanctuary while offering local residents more security, reconstruction and development. On poppy eradication, Ibrahim said Karzai will welcome a clear plan and a viable alternative livelihoods program. END SUMMARY

PM Azziz Visit

"A Good Visit" But the Wrong Person

12. (C) On January 6, Deputy National Security Advisor (NSA)

Engineer Ibrahim provided A/DCM a readout of Pakistan PM Azziz,s January 4 visit to Afghanistan. Ibrahim characterized the overall visit as a "good trip" as President Karzai and PM Azziz had spoken openly and frankly. Karzai strongly believes that the Prime Minister wants a peaceful and prosperous relationship. Karzai's position, with which Ibrahim agreed, had been that a way must be found to change the minds of "other people", namely the Pakistan military. They must be encouraged to think about broader goals for Pakistan, including economic prosperity. Ibrahim said the visit gave Afghanistan some hope that there might be changes in Pakistani thinking and a chance for deepening relations.

13. (C) While the overall visit was positive, Karzai reportedly took a hard line with Azziz on Pakistan's responsibility for cross-border terrorism. Afghanistan's position is that the border is not the issue -- command and control is. Ibrahim said that Azziz had offered 1,000 scholarships for Afghan students to study in Pakistan, but President Karzai refused the offer, explaining to Azziz that there were over 200,000 students in Kandahar and in the border regions who had no chance to go to schools because they had been burned down by insurgents. This is the priority. Karzai told Azziz, and repeated to the press, that Afghanistan will know that its neighbors want peace only when it sees an end to the burning of schools, the explosion of bombs, and the killing of Afghan people along the border region. An early sign of progress would be whether Afghanistan had a peaceful or bloody spring.

14. (S) In a separate meeting with A/DCM January 8, Foreign Minister Spanta's Special Advisor, Davood Moradian, echoed similar views about engaging the Pakistan military. He

KABUL 00000094 002 OF 004

underlined that the structures of power in Pakistan were different from those in Afghanistan and other countries. Azziz was a civilian, an economist from the World Bank, who understood economic integration and development but was not the key person to be engaging on security and border issues. The same could be said for FM Kasuri, Moradian said. The GOA would now be looking for ways to engage ISI and Pakistani military decision-makers.

15. (S) Moradian described matter of factly the consequences of what he characterized as an unequal relationship with Pakistan. Afghanistan was always on the defensive against attacks from Pakistan which held the upper hand in the relationship; the GOA was always reacting. Moradian saw the ISI as the real policymakers in Pakistan. He joked that other countries had an army, but in Pakistan the army had a country. He portrayed the Pakistani military as highly sophisticated, well-educated, and well-paid. In response, the GOA's strategy was aimed at trying to establish relations with a wide range of Pakistani ministries and civil society members in an effort to help increase their police leverage.

Fencing and Mining the Border

16. (C) Deputy NSA Ibrahim reported that the Afghan response to the Pakistani proposal to fence and mine the border was clear) it will not stop terrorism and will only separate families, tribes, and clans and put the civilian population at risk. The real issue is command and control centers in Pakistan. Azziz had explained to Karzai that the process would be selective -- some areas would be mined, while some would be fenced. According to Ibrahim, Azziz had not taken a hard line on the issue during their meeting, which sent a signal to the GOA that civilian decision-makers may not be as committed to the strategy as public statements might indicate. The GOA would know in two weeks what Pakistan had decided. Ibrahim noted that Pashtun tribes on both sides of the border were unhappy with the proposal and have threatened to take the GOP to court. Ibrahim thought that the border proposal was more political in nature than about countering

terrorism. It reflects Pakistan's interest in demarcating the Durand line.

North Waziristan Agreement

¶7. (C) President Karzai reportedly told Azziz that he believed that a new state had been created in North Waziristan, an area that used to be part of Afghanistan. Karzai called for more concrete examples of Pakistani efforts to crack down on the Taliban leadership in Quetta and North Waziristan.

Jirgas

¶8. (C) Ibrahim stated that Azziz announced that the GOP would shortly be appointing a Commission to start work on the cross border jirgas. He characterized the GOP's reluctance to engage on Afghanistan's proposal as "not an official rejection, but more of a delay," and welcomed the announcement of a Commission. The GOA is ready to engage through that agreed channel. Delays in getting to this point have, unfortunately, encouraged the Taliban to speak out against the jirgas, he said. Karzai reportedly reiterated to Azziz that the main purpose of the jirgas was political. Karzai wanted both sides to openly discuss all the cross border problems and focus on the sources of terrorism.

Refugees

¶9. (C) Asked if any decisions had been made to close refugee camps in Pakistan, Ibrahim responded that registration of

KABUL 00000094 003 OF 004

refugees had begun and would continue through January. The two sides would then set a deadline for sending refugees back to Afghanistan. He said that President Karzai insisted that Pakistani authorities go into the refugee camps to close down terrorist training camps. Ibrahim noted Pakistani military's reluctance to go into the refugee camps to close down training centers.

Other Issues: Musa Qala, NAC, Poppy Eradication

Musa Qala

¶10. (C) Ibrahim described the main challenge of Musa Qala as preventing the area from becoming a sanctuary for Taliban while respecting the needs of the local community. Governor Wafa was now working closely with the tribal leaders in Musa Qala and other areas including Sangin. Ibrahim saw the area as divided between those who supported the Taliban and those who supported the GOA. The GOA therefore needed to demonstrate that it had more to offer in terms of security, reconstruction and development, while showing that the Taliban offered only more fighting and instability. The task now was for the GOA to instill optimism, create confidence, and set the right conditions for people to want to remain in Musa Qala under GOA control. Evidence of reconstruction and development and law and order would be key, Ibrahim stressed. Spanta's Special Advisor Moradian was more critical, arguing that the agreement was seen broadly as a concession to the enemy. As such, it weakened ISAF in the eyes of the public. It is critical that it not be replicated, he stressed.

NAC Meeting

¶11. (C) A/DCM briefed Ibrahim on the NAC's intention to invite Foreign Minister Spanta and Defense Minister Wardak to the January 26 NAC in Brussels. She stressed the importance

of having both present to make Afghanistan,s case to the Europeans.

¶12. (C) Ibrahim was confident that both Spanta and Wardak would attend (FM Spanta's Special Advisor Moradian later confirmed that Spanta planned to attend). He expressed worry that some Europeans, with the exception of the eastern Europeans, had become demoralized. They were now complaining about the smallest problems or setbacks. Ibrahim was concerned that when the Europeans made noises about leaving Afghanistan it only helped the enemy. Ibrahim pointed to France,s "withdrawal" which, he believed, would have minimal impact on the ground, but sent the incorrect message to the Taliban that the Europeans were pulling out. (Comment: Ibrahim was apparently referring to French DefMin Alliot-Marie's mid-December announcement that France was withdrawing its 200 Special Forces that had been deployed under OEF in RC-East. France is however maintaining its ISAF commitment of approximately 1,000 troops in the Kabul area. End Comment) Ibrahim said the Afghan message to NATO would be to "stay strong", keep fighting terrorism, and help Afghanistan. A/DCM responded that it would be useful for the NAC to hear this message directly from Spanta and Wardak.

Poppy Eradication

¶13. (C) Ibrahim stressed the importance of approaching poppy eradication with a clear plan. In particular, he argued for better programs for alternative livelihoods. He said that Presidential Economic Advisor Nadiri and the Agriculture Ministry were working on a concrete plan for alternative livelihoods, e.g., substituting cotton production in Helmand for poppy cultivation. Ibrahim also called for the arrests of traffickers who were enticing farmers to grow poppy. He

KABUL 00000094 004 OF 004

said that Russia had expressed interest in assisting with eradication in response to the influx of heroin into Russian cities and the increase in drug addicts in the country.

Comment

¶14. (C) Despite differences over the border fencing and mining issue which Karzai has pointed to as evidence of a widening gap, the GOA was generally satisfied with the visit and the open and frank exchanges that took place. It is, however, being realistic about the ultimate impact of such visits. It delivered a clear message about its needs and expectations. The GOA is still pinning hopes on the cross border jirgas to help resolve cross-border tensions. The jirgas take on greater urgency now as one way to obviate the need for what it sees as draconian border measures being pushed by Pakistan. Press reports indicate that Pakistan has decided to go forward with fencing and mining which will only inflame tensions on both sides of the border.

NEWELL